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Abstract
We present a dynamic epistemic logic for knowledge change of
rational agents. Existing approaches only deal with partial public
announcements, that means an announcement may lead to an incon-
sistent state. We introduce an extension of the multi-modal logic S5n
featuring total public announcements where an update cannot result
in an inconsistency. We also study total public announcements in the
context of common knowledge and relativized common knowledge.
1 Introduction
At the end of the eighties, Plaza published the famous article about logics of
public communications [13]. In the sequel, the theory of knowledge change
caused by incoming information has been further developed by many authors.
We confine ourselves to mentioning just a few typical articles: Baltag et
al. [1, 2], van Benthem et al. [3, 4, 5, 6], van Ditmarsch et al. [7, 8, 9, 10], as
well as Renne [14].
The language for logics of public announcements is the language of stan-
dard multi-modal logic augmented with announcement operators [α] for every
formula α. The expression [α]β then stands for after every announcement of
α, it holds that β. In the classical setting, announcement has to be read as
truthful announcement. Therefore, announcements are partial: that is
¬[α]⊥ (1)
is not valid (see [9], Proposition 4.11).
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We propose a system in which announcements are total, that is (1) holds.
Therefore, in our system announcements need not be truthful; they can be
true or false. As usual, a true announcement will lead to an update of an
agent’s epistemic state. However, a false announcement will not lead to an
inconsistent epistemic state, it will automatically be ignored by the agents.
That is, after a false announcement, an agent will have the same epistemic
state as before the announcement. Because (1) holds in our system, we call
it consistency preserving. A system for consistency preserving belief change
(instead of knowledge change) is studied in [15].
A property we keep from the classical setting is
p→ [α]p. (2)
That means, an announcement does not change atomic facts. We call a
system that satisfies (2) atomic preserving.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present an axioma-
tization of a system for total public announcements which satisfies both (1)
and (2). We also propose a Kripke semantics for our system and show sound-
ness and completeness of our axiomatization. In Section 3, we extend our
logic with common knowledge operators. We show that agents can achieve
common knowledge by receiving an announcement. For this system, the
completeness proof cannot make use of a translation to a language without
announcements (which is possible in the case without common knowledge).
Completeness of total public announcements with common knowledge is es-
tablished via the notion of maximal consistent sets. Recently, relativized
common knowledge has received much attention in the context of logics for
public announcements [6, 4, 5]. We introduce a system of relativized common
knowledge and total public announcements in Section 4. Again, we establish
soundness and completeness of our system. It follows from the proof that
the addition of total public announcements to relativized common knowl-
edge does not increase the expressive power of the language. We conclude
this paper with some discussion in Section 5.
2 A system for total public announcements
We introduce the language LAn of multi-modal logic with dynamic-style op-
erators for public announcements.
Given a natural number n ≥ 1, we fix the set A = {1, . . . , n} of n rational
agents. Further, we take a countable non-empty set P of propositions, de-
noted by p, q, . . ., possibly with subscripts. The set of LAn formulas is defined
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by the following grammar (p ∈ P , i ∈ A),
α, β, . . . ::= p | ¬α | α ∧ β | Kiα | [α]β.
The formula Kiα stands for the agent i knows α, the formula [α]β means β
holds after the public announcement of α. The L0 formulas are the proposi-
tional formulas, the Ln formulas are the modal formulas without announce-
ment operators.
For all formulas α, β of LAn , we define α∨β, α→ β, and α↔ β as usual.
Further, we let
> := p0 ∨ ¬p0 and ⊥ := p0 ∧ ¬p0
for some fixed p0 ∈ P . Iterated announcements [α]kβ are defined by induction
on k. We set
[α]0β := β and [α]k+1β := [α][α]kβ.
The following system for total public announcements in the context of belief
change can be obtained from Gerbrandy and Groeneveld [12]. It results from
deleting edges in a Kripke structure.
(PT) Every instance of a propositional tautology,
(K) Ki(α→ β)→ (Kiα→ Kiβ),
(4) Kiα→ KiKiα,
(5) ¬Kiα→ Ki¬Kiα,
(A1) [α]p↔ p,
(A2) [α](β → γ)→ ([α]β → [α]γ),
(A3) [α]¬β ↔ ¬[α]β,
(A4.B) [α]Kiβ ↔ Ki(α→ [α]β),
(MP)
α α→ β
β
, (NEC.1)
α
Kiα
, (NEC.2)
α
[β]α
.
To obtain a system for knowledge change, we cannot just add the knowledge
axiom Kiα → α since that would lead to an inconsistency. The theory S5An
is obtained by changing axiom (A4.B) to (A4) and adding axioms (T) and
(A5).
(T) Kiα→ α,
(A4) α→ ([α]Kiβ ↔ Ki(α→ [α]β)),
(A5) ¬α→ ([α]β ↔ β).
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The instances of axiom (A5) of the form
¬α→ ([α]Kiβ ↔ Kiβ) (3)
can be seen as a necessary companion to the knowledge axiom (T), because
a false formula can never be known by an agent, thus it can never be learned.
Note that we could formulate the system S5An with (3) instead of (A5). Then
(A5) would be provable in the resulting system. However, later we will con-
sider an extension of S5An by common knowledge operators. There, things
get much simpler if (A5) is already included as an axiom.
By replacing (T) with the (D)-axiom ¬Ki⊥, the agents can decide whether
to accept an incoming formula or to reject it. For a detailed treatment of
this approach, see [15].
Our system is consistency preserving as well as atomic preserving. We
have the following lemma.
Lemma 1 For all LAn formulas α and all propositions p ∈ P we have
S5An ` ¬[α]⊥ and S5An ` p→ [α]p.
Observe, that the public announcement operator is self-dual due to axiom
(A3). This means we do not have to distinct the statements ’β holds after
every (truthful) public announcement of α’ and ’β holds after some (truth-
ful) public announcement of α’. In our setting, there is only one public
announcement of a formula. It can be truthful or not.
We will now state some properties which will be helpful for the rest of
the paper.
Lemma 2 For all LAn formulas α, β, and γ we have that S5An proves
[α](β ∧ γ) ↔ ([α]β ∧ [α]γ),
[α](β ∨ γ) ↔ ([α]β ∨ [α]γ),
[α]Kiβ ↔ (¬α ∧Kiβ) ∨ (α ∧Ki(α→ [α]β)).
We now give semantics to our logic of total public announcements. Since we
deal with an extension of S5n, we will only need Kripke structures where the
accessibility relations are equivalence relations.
Definition 3 An n-Kripke structure K = (S,R1, . . . , Rn, V ) is an (n + 2)-
tuple, where S 6= ∅ is a set of states, Ri ⊆ S2 for all i ∈ A, and V : P 7→
Pow(S) is a valuation function.
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Since n is fixed, we will drop it and use only the term Kripke structure.
The set S is called the universe of K, denoted by |K|. In the sequel, we
will write Keqn for the class of all Kripke structures with equivalence relations
exclusively.
We will now define the validity of an LAn formula in a state s of a Kripke
structure K. The crucial point in this definition is the case of [α]β, where we
simultaneously define an operation on K, depending on α and s.
Definition 4 Let K = (S,R1, . . . , Rn, V ) be an arbitrary Kripke structure
and s ∈ S be given. The validity of LAn formulas in the Kripke-world K, s is
inductively defined as follows.
K, s |= p iff s ∈ V (p),
K, s |= ¬α iff K, s 6|= α,
K, s |= α ∧ β iff K, s |= α and K, s |= β,
K, s |= Kiα iff for every t ∈ S, sRit ⇒ K, t |= α,
K, s |= [α]β iff Kα,s, s |= β,
where for given α ∈ LAn and s ∈ |K|, the Kripke structure Kα,s is simultane-
ously defined by
Kα,s := (S,Rα,s1 , . . . , R
α,s
n , V ),
Rα,si :=
{
Ri ∩ {(u, v) ∈ S2 | K, u |= α iff K, v |= α} if K, s |= α,
Ri if K, s 6|= α.
We say that an LAn formula α is valid in the Kripke structure K (K |= α), iff
for all s ∈ S, K, s |= α. The formula α is valid with respect to Keqn (Keqn |= α),
iff for all K ∈ Keqn , K |= α. Further, we say that α is satisfiable in Keqn , iff
there is a K ∈ Keqn and an s ∈ |K|, such that K, s |= α.
If all Ri in K are equivalence relations, then K
α,s belongs to Keqn , as is
stated in the next lemma. It is an immediate consequence of the definition
of Rα,si .
Lemma 5 For all Kripke structures K, all LAn formulas α, and all s ∈ |K|
we have
K ∈ Keqn ⇒ Kα,s ∈ Keqn .
Example 6 (Wise men puzzle) Alice, Bob, and Charlie wear a hat and
cannot see its color. But they can see, of course, the color of the others’ hats.
There are only two red and three blue hats, and every person knows that.
The Kripke structure K, which represents this situation is shown in Figure 1
(reflexivity and symmetry of the relations RA, RB, and RC are self-evident).
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Figure 1: The initial structure
In the state rbb, Alice wears a red hat, whereas Bob and Charlie both wear a
blue hat. Now, Alice publicly announces, that she does not know the color of
her hat, which is true. After that, Bob announces the same true fact. This
results in the Kripke structure
(K¬KArA∧¬KAbA,rbb)¬KBrB∧¬KBbB ,rbb,
which is illustrated in Figure 2.
bbb
bbr brb
B
rbb
ANNNNNNNNNNNNN
brr rbr
ANNNNNNNNNNNNN
rrb
B
ANNNNNNNNNNNNN
Figure 2: The situation after two announcements
Now Charlie knows that he is wearing a blue hat. Observe, that for a false
announcement, e.g. bA in the state rbb, we have that K
bA,rbb = K.
Soundness of our system can be proved in the usual way.
Lemma 7 The system S5An is sound with respect to Keqn , i.e. for all LAn for-
mulas α we have
S5An ` α ⇒ Keqn |= α.
Proof The proof is by induction on the length of the derivation. In the base
case, soundness of the axiom (A4) is proved as follows. Let K ∈ Keqn , s ∈ |K|,
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and i ∈ A be given and assume that K, s |= α. Then we have
K, s |= [α]Kiβ iff Kα,s, s |= Kiβ
iff for all t ∈ S, sRα,si t ⇒ Kα,s, t |= β
iff for all t ∈ S, sRit and K, t |= α ⇒ K, t |= [α]β
iff K, s |= Ki(α→ [α]β).
In the induction step, soundness of the rule (NEC.2) immediately follows
from Lemma 5. 2
Completeness of S5An can be proved via a translation from LAn to Ln since the
two languages have the same expressive strength. As a preparation, we will
define a translation from {[α]β | α, β ∈ Ln} to Ln.
Definition 8 The function h from {[α]β | α, β ∈ Ln} to Ln is inductively
defined by
h([α]p) := p,
h([α]¬β) := ¬h([α]β),
h([α](β ∧ γ)) := h([α]β) ∧ h([α]γ),
h([α]Kiβ) := (¬α ∧Kiβ) ∨ (α ∧Ki(α→ h([α]β))).
Of course, h eliminates the announcement operator. Its definition leads to
two important properties which we state in the following lemma.
Lemma 9 For all LAn formulas α, β and all Ln formulas ϕ, ψ we have
S5An ` [ϕ]ψ ↔ h([ϕ]ψ) and S5An ` α↔ β ⇒ S5An ` [α]ψ ↔ [β]ψ.
We are now able to define our translation t, which eliminates the announce-
ment operator in every LAn formula.
Definition 10 The translation t from LAn to Ln is inductively defined by
t(p) := p,
t(¬α) := ¬t(α),
t(α ∧ β) := t(α) ∧ t(β),
t(Kiα) := Kit(α),
t([α]β) := h([t(α)]t(β)).
It is obvious that for every LAn formula α, its translation t(α) is a formula of
Ln. In addition, we can prove the equivalence of α and t(α) in S5An .
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Lemma 11 For all LAn formulas α we have
S5An ` α↔ t(α).
Lemma 11 is very helpful for proofs by induction on arbitrary LAn formulas.
Making use of it, one can easily show the following property.
Corollary 12 For all LAn formulas α, β, and γ we have
S5An ` α↔ β ⇒ S5An ` [α]γ ↔ [β]γ.
As another consequence of Lemma 11 we get the following equivalence con-
cerning consecutive announcement operators.
Lemma 13 For all LAn formulas α, β, and γ we have
S5An ` α ∧ [α]β → ([α][β]γ ↔ [α ∧ [α]β]γ).
Making use of Lemma 11, we can easily show completeness of S5An .
Lemma 14 The system S5An is complete with respect to Keqn , i.e. for all LAn
formulas α we have
Keqn |= α ⇒ S5An ` α.
Proof Assuming Keqn |= α, we get Keqn |= t(α) by soundness and Lemma
11. Due to completeness of S5n, we have S5n ` t(α), which yields S5An ` t(α)
because S5n is contained in S5
A
n . Now, we get S5
A
n ` α by Lemma 11. 2
In a next step, we define announcement-resistant LAn formulas. This notion
is inspired by – but different than – the notion of successful formulas, see [8].
A formula α is successful if [α]α is valid. However, in our setting not even
propositions would be successful formulas. As an alternative, we introduce
the class of announcement-resistant formulas.
Definition 15 An LAn formula α is called announcement-resistant, if for all
LAn formulas β we have
S5An ` α→ [β]α.
Observe, that S5An proves α → [β]kα for all k ≥ 0, if α is announcement-
resistant. There are many announcement-resistant formulas, as the following
lemma shows.
Lemma 16
1. All L0 formulas as well as all provable LAn formulas are announcement-
resistant.
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2. If α and β are announcement-resistant, then so also are the formulas
α ∧ β, α ∨ β, and Kiα.
By the previous lemma, we know that Kiα is announcement-resistant for
all L0 formulas α. That means knowledge in propositional formulas can
never be contracted by public announcements. We can therefore say that the
logic of total public announcements formalizes expansion for propositional
knowledge.
As we have seen in Example 6, agents can really expand their knowl-
edge due to announcements. The next lemma shows that they learn true
announcement-resistant formulas by one single announcement.
Lemma 17 Let α be an announcement-resistant LAn formula. Then for all
k ≥ 1, all m ≥ 0, and all i1, . . . , im ∈ A we have
S5An ` α→ [α]kKim . . . Ki1α.
3 Incorporating common knowledge
Lemma 17 even shows that agents can acquire so-called common knowledge.
In this section, we will extend our logic of total public announcements by
common knowledge operators. To this aim we have to formalize the notion
of mutual knowledge. For every non-empty group G ⊆ A of agents, the
formula EkGα is inductively defined by
E0Gα := α and E
k+1
G α :=
∧
i∈G
(KiE
k
Gα).
We simply write EGα for E
1
Gα to express that everybody in G knows α. The
following property holds.
Lemma 18 For all LAn formulas α and β we have
S5An ` α→ ([α]EGβ ↔ EG(α→ [α]β)).
The language LC,An of common knowledge and public announcements is the
language LAn expanded by the common knowledge operator CG for every non-
empty group G ⊆ A of agents. To define the validity of LC,An formulas in a
Kripke-world K, s, we add the following clause to Definition 4.
K, s |= CGα iff for every t ∈ |K|, s(RG)?t ⇒ K, t |= α,
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where (RG)
? denotes the transitive closure of RG :=
⋃{Ri | i ∈ G}, see Fagin
et al. [11]. It is an easy exercise to show that
K, s |= CGα iff for every t, there is a G-path from s to t ⇒ K, t |= α.
The system S5C,An is defined as extension of S5
A
n by an additional announce-
ment axiom, the axioms and rules for common knowledge, as well as a rule
for common knowledge after an announcement.
Definition 19 The theory S5C,An is defined to be S5
A
n augmented by the
following axioms and rules.
(A6) α ∧ [α]β → ([α][β]γ ↔ [α ∧ [α]β]γ),
(C) CGα→ EG(α ∧ CGα),
(IND.1)
α→ EG(α ∧ β)
α→ CGβ , (IND.2)
α→ [β]γ α ∧ β → EG(β → α)
α ∧ β → [β]CGγ .
Axiom (A6) is provable in S5An , see Lemma 13. However, this is not the case
for S5C,An since there is no translation available that eliminates the announce-
ment operators. The rule (IND.2) is a slight modification of the action rule
from Baltag et al. in [1, 2].
To show soundness and completeness, we will need the following notion
of a Gα-path.
Definition 20 Let α ∈ LC,An , K ∈ Keqn , ∅ 6= G ⊆ A, and s, t ∈ |K|. Then we
say that there is a Gα-path from s to t, if there are states u1, u2, . . . , uk ∈ |K|
s.t. sRGu1RGu2RG . . . RGuk, uk = t, and for all j, 1 ≤ j ≤ k ⇒ K, uj |= α.
It is easy to see that K, s |= α implies
K, s |= [α]CGβ iff
for every t, there is a Gα-path from s to t ⇒ K, t |= [α]β.
Lemma 21 The system S5C,An is sound with respect to Keqn , i.e. for all LC,An
formulas α we have
S5C,An ` α ⇒ Keqn |= α.
Proof The proof is by induction on the length of the derivation. In the
induction step, soundness of the rule (IND.2) is proved as follows. Suppose,
the formula α ∧ β → [β]CGγ has been derived with the rule (IND.2). Then,
by induction hypothesis, we know that the formulas (a) α → [β]γ and (b)
α ∧ β → EG(β → α) are valid. Now, take any Kripke-world K, s such that
10
K, s |= α ∧ β. Using (b) we get that K, t |= α in every world t ∈ |K| which is
reachable on a Gβ-path from s. But then, by (a), we have that K, t |= [β]γ
in every t reachable on a Gβ-path from s. This implies, by definition of the
announcement semantics, that K, s |= [β]CGγ, and we are done. 2
Lemma 22 For all LC,An formulas α, β, and γ we have
S5C,An ` α ∧ CG(α→ [α]β)→ [α]CGβ,
S5C,An ` α↔ β ⇒ S5C,An ` [α]γ ↔ [β]γ.
Since the formula α ∧ [α]CGβ → CG(α → [α]β) is not valid (compare with
(A4)), there is no translation available that could be used to give an easy
completeness proof of S5C,An . Thus we have to employ maximal consistent
sets to show completeness. Our argument is the same as the one presented
in [11] for the logic of common knowledge except that we have more cases in
the truth lemma. We start by defining the closure cl(α) of a formula α.
Definition 23 For all LC,An formulas α, sub+(α) is the smallest set which
satisfies the following conditions.
1. α ∈ sub+(α).
2. If ¬β ∈ sub+(α), then β ∈ sub+(α).
3. If β ∧ γ ∈ sub+(α), then β, γ ∈ sub+(α).
4. If Kiβ ∈ sub+(α), then β ∈ sub+(α).
5. If CGβ ∈ sub+(α), then EGβ,EGCGβ ∈ sub+(α).
6. If [β]p ∈ sub+(α), then β, p ∈ sub+(α).
7. If [β]¬γ ∈ sub+(α), then [β]γ,¬γ ∈ sub+(α).
8. If [β](γ ∧ δ) ∈ sub+(α), then [β]γ, [β]δ, γ ∧ δ ∈ sub+(α).
9. If [β]Kiγ ∈ sub+(α), then Kiγ,Ki(β → [β]γ) ∈ sub+(α).
10. If [β]CGγ ∈ sub+(α), then CGγ,EG(β → [β]CGγ) ∈ sub+(α).
11. If [β][γ]δ ∈ sub+(α), then [β]δ, [γ]δ, [β ∧ [β]γ]δ ∈ sub+(α).
The closure of α is defined by cl(α) := sub+(α) ∪ {¬β | β ∈ sub+(α)}.
Observe, that for α = [β]γ, we immediately get both sub+(β) ⊆ sub+(α) and
sub+(γ) ⊆ sub+(α).
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Lemma 24 For every LC,An formula α, the set cl(α) is finite.
Note that cl(α) is not closed under complements: for a given β ∈ cl(α) we
need not have ¬β ∈ cl(α). However, there is always a formula ∼β ∈ cl(α),
which is equivalent to ¬β.
Definition 25 For every LC,An formula α, the canonical structure of α is
defined by Kα = (con(α), R1, . . . , Rn, V ), where
con(α) := {U ∩ cl(α) | U is a maximal S5C,An -consistent set},
Ri := {(X, Y ) | X/Ki = Y/Ki},
V (p) := {X | p ∈ X},
and X/Ki denotes the set {β | Kiβ ∈ X}.
For the notion of a maximal consistent set with respect to a theory, see for
instance [11]. Observe, that Kα is in Keqn for all LC,An formulas α.
Lemma 26 (Truth Lemma) Let α be an arbitrary LC,An formula and Kα be
its canonical structure. Then we have for all β ∈ cl(α) and all X ∈ con(α),
β ∈ X ⇔ Kα, X |= β.
ProofWe prove this lemma by induction on β, and we omit the cases where
β does not begin with an announcement operator because they are standard.
Hence assume β begins with an announcement operator. We show by side
induction on δ that for any announcement operator [γ] the claim holds for
β = [γ]δ. The base case is immediate, we have [γ]p ∈ X iff Kα, X |= [γ]p by
axiom (A1) and Definition 25. The cases β = [γ]¬ϕ and β = [γ](ϕ ∧ ψ) are
also straightforward.
Now let β = [γ]Kiϕ. The interesting step is the case Kα, X |= γ in the
direction from right to left. First, one can show that the set
Y := {Kiξ | Kiξ ∈ X} ∪ {¬Kiξ | ¬Kiξ ∈ X} ∪ {γ,¬[γ]ϕ}
is inconsistent, using the induction hypothesis for γ and [γ]ϕ. Using the
axioms (T), (4), and (5), we can prove the existence of a set
Z := {Kiξ1, . . . , Kiξk,¬Kiξk+1, . . . ,¬Kiξl} ⊆ Y
s.t. the set Z ∪ {¬Ki(γ → [γ]ϕ)} is inconsistent. Since Z ⊆ X and X ∈
con(α), we have Ki(γ → [γ]ϕ) ∈ X. Using axiom (A4) and again the induc-
tion hypothesis for γ we get that [γ]Kiϕ ∈ X.
12
For β = [γ]CGϕ, the case Kα, X |= γ in the direction from right to left
is the challenging part of the proof. For every Y ∈ con(α) and for the set
B := {Z ∈ con(α) | Kα, Z |= [γ]CGϕ}, we define the formulas
ψY :=
∧
ξ∈Y
ξ and χB :=
∨
Y ∈B
ψY .
It is not hard to show, that the formulas χB → [γ]ϕ and χB∧γ → EG(γ → χB)
are both derivable. Applying the rule (IND.2) we get ` χB ∧ γ → [γ]CGϕ.
Since X ∈ B by assumption, and γ ∈ X by induction hypothesis, we have
` ψX → [γ]CGϕ. Hence, we know that [γ]CGϕ ∈ X.
The last case of our induction is β = [γ][ϕ]ψ. Here we distinct the
three cases ∼γ ∈ X, ∼[γ]ϕ ∈ X, and γ, [γ]ϕ ∈ X. All three cases are
straightforward using the axioms (A5) and (A6), respectively. Observe, that
we need the second induction hypothesis in the third case. 2
Due to the Truth Lemma, we know that every S5C,An -consistent formula is
satisfiable in Keqn , thus we have completeness.
Theorem 27 The system S5C,An is complete with respect to Keqn , i.e. for all
LC,An formulas α we have
Keqn |= α ⇒ S5C,An ` α.
As an immediate consequence of our completeness proof, we get the finite
model property and that the satisfiability problem is decidable.
We now extend the definition of announcement-resistance to the richer
language. An LC,An formula α is called announcement-resistant, if
S5C,An ` α→ [β]α
for every LC,An formula β.
It is still true, that all L0 formulas as well as all provable LC,An formulas are
announcement-resistant. In addition, if α and β are announcement-resistant,
then so also are the formulas α ∧ β, α ∨ β, Kiα, and CGα.
Lemma 28 Let α be an announcement-resistant LC,An formula and G ⊆ A
be a non-empty group of agents. Then for all k ≥ 1 we have
S5C,An ` α→ [α]kCGα.
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4 Relativized common knowledge
In this section, we will study operators for relativized common knowledge.
We will present a sound and complete axiomatization for the logic of rela-
tivized common knowledge augmented by total public announcements.
The notion of relativized common knowledge is a generalized version of
common knowledge. The language of LRC,An formulas is the language LAn
extended by the binary operator RCG for every non-empty group G ⊆ A of
agents. The validity for relativized common knowledge is defined by
K, s |= RCG(α, β) iff
for every t, there is a Gα-path from s to t ⇒ K, t |= β.
It is obvious that common knowledge can be defined by means of relativized
common knowledge via CGα := RCG(>, α). It can be shown that relativized
common knowledge is strictly more expressive than common knowledge, see
van Benthem et al. [4, 5] for a proof. For instance, the until operator of tem-
poral logic can be defined using the relativized common knowledge operator.
Definition 29 The theory S5RC,An is defined to be S5
A
n augmented by the
following axioms and rules.
(A7) α→ ([α]RCG(β, γ)↔ RCG(α ∧ [α]β, [α]γ)),
(RC) RCG(α, β)→ EG(α→ β ∧ RCG(α, β)),
(IND.3)
α→ EG(β → α ∧ γ)
α→ RCG(β, γ) .
Lemma 30 For all LRC,An formulas α, β, and γ we have
S5RC,An ` RCG(α, β)→ (α→ β),
S5RC,An ` RCG(α, β → γ)→ (RCG(α, β)→ RCG(α, γ)),
S5RC,An ` EG(α→ β ∧ RCG(α, β))→ RCG(α, β),
S5RC,An ` α ⇒ S5RC,An ` RCG(β, α).
Theorem 31 The system S5RC,An is sound and complete with respect to Keqn ,
i.e. for all LRC,An formulas α we have
S5RC,An ` α ⇔ Keqn |= α.
14
Proof Soundness is proved as usual. The completeness proof for relativized
common knowledge without announcement operators is similar to the proof
of Theorem 27. The full system S5RC,An can now be treated by providing
a translation which eliminates the announcements. Such a translation can
easily be defined: simply observe that the axioms (A5) and (A7) imply
S5RC,An ` [α]RCG(β, γ)↔ (¬α ∧ RCG(β, γ)) ∨ (α ∧ RCG(α ∧ [α]β, [α]γ))
(compare with the case for [α]Kiβ in Lemma 2). Making use of that transla-
tion and of the completeness for the system without announcements, we can
show completeness of S5RC,An as in Lemma 14. 2
5 Discussion
In the classical setting, public announcements are considered to be truthful.
Thus, a specific announcement cannot happen in all possible worlds. If an
announcement α is false in a given world, then the corresponding update
action [α] cannot be performed, formally [α]⊥ holds in that world.
We have presented a semantics, and corresponding formal systems, in
which an announcement can happen in every possible world. Thus, an-
nouncements are total, that is the formula ¬[α]⊥ is valid.
If an announcement is true, then an agent’s knowledge gets updated; if
it is false, then the agent’s knowledge remains unchanged. In the classical
setting, a false announcement cannot happen. In our approach it can happen
but does not change an agent’s knowledge. Thus we have a semantics which
internalizes the idea of doing nothing when a false announcement is made.
This is a step towards a system in which an agent’s knowledge and beliefs
are considered. In such a setting, every announcement has to be performed
since it may change an agent’s beliefs even if its knowledge will not be af-
fected. Thus it is necessary that announcements are total if we talk about
both knowledge and beliefs of an agent.
In the present approach we use an alethic criterion (namely wether an
announcement is true or false) to decide wether an agent’s knowledge should
be updated or not. Of course, one may argue about such a criterion. However,
since an agent’s knowledge has to be true by the knowledge axiom (T), it
should only be updated by announcements that are indeed true. Therefore,
unlike in the case of belief updates, it is not possible to use an epistemic
criterion. The approach from [15], for instance, would lead to false knowledge
by already accepting an announcement if it is consistent with the previous
knowledge.
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There are already languages available in which our form of announcements
can be expressed. However, they are very expressive: non-deterministic
choice, truthful public announcements, and PDL-like test operators [1] are
needed in order to model our system. We have presented a lean and di-
rect syntax and semantics for total public announcements which leads to
new concepts such as announcement-resistant formulas. An interesting open
question is to give a syntactic characterization of this class of formulas. As
already mentioned, further work will also be done to investigate systems for
updating knowledge and beliefs of an agent.
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